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DOES CONTRACT LAW NEED MORALITY?
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC*
WENHAO LIU**
ABSTRACT
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior
normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or
economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In
doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the marketplace as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and
welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the market theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive
theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and theory should account for values other than economic efficiency is a
longstanding debate. Whatever the merits of that debate, we conclude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by
Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to
the morality of markets.
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INTRODUCTION
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract (hereinafter Market Theory),
which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract
law than either the moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory.1 According to the Market Theory,
contract law ought to be structured to support well-functioning
markets because such markets are morally desirable.2 The moral
virtues of markets thus mark both the purpose and limits of contract law.3 If contract law exists to support well-functioning markets because such markets are morally valuable, then it follows
that the law should not support immoral or, as termed by Oman,
“pernicious” markets.4
The significance of this effort should not be understated. A
clear normative foundation is essential to the understanding and
application of contract law.5 Only through a theory of why the law
enforces contracts can one determine, for example, which promises
should be enforced and which should not, how to calculate damages
for breach, and the circumstances under which performance will
be excused.6 The Dignity of Commerce thus confronts questions
that are both theoretically difficult and of practical importance to
courts and lawmakers.
I. THE DIGNITY OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT)
One of the book’s most important contributions is its emphasis on the positive role played by markets and thus, by extension, of contracts.7 In an era rife with warnings about the market’s
dangers to society,8 Oman’s cogent reminder of the market’s benefits
is both refreshing and welcome. Oman also correctly emphasizes
NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 21 (2016).
Id.
3 Id. at 8.
4 Id. at 160.
5 See ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 227 (2d ed. 2016).
6 Id.
7 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 23.
8 E.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 11–12 (2012).
1
2
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contract law’s important contribution to proper market functioning.9 Although this point is recognized in economic treatments of
contract law,10 Oman argues that it has not been accorded sufficient attention, by either economic or moralist theories of contract.11
Less recognized in the literature is the market’s (and, therefore, contract’s) often forgotten role in organizing productive social
interactions, and it is here that Oman’s treatment really shines.12
These social benefits, Oman argues, are so important that it is
these benefits—rather than a commitment to markets in and of
themselves—that justify the use of state resources to support markets, and thus contracts.13
The Dignity of Commerce is descriptive, normative, and prescriptive all at once. This is both a strength and weakness of the
book. Oman’s account is, at least in theory, more comprehensive
than the competing theories he seeks to replace. Both moralist and
economic justifications for contract law have, for example, been
criticized as providing a poor, or at least incomplete, descriptive
account of contract law.14 Oman’s descriptive account, by recognizing that conceptions of morality and blameworthiness impact
contract law, provides a descriptively more appealing account than
theories that contend that contract law is explained solely by economic considerations or solely by moral ones.15
But this insight is not new. Practitioners of law and economics have long recognized that judges and lawmakers, being largely
See OMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1115,
1152 (1998) (explaining how third-party enforcement of contracts facilitates the
emergence of sophisticated capital markets); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Wenhao Liu,
& Marc L. Melcher, Contract Development in a Matching Market: The Case of Kidney Exchange, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 20 (2017) (discussing the positive role played by contracts in various markets, including matching markets).
11 OMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
12 See id. at 11, 15.
13 Id. at 15.
14 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1989) (arguing that moralist
theories of contract are irrelevant to wide swaths of contract law, including the
choice of default rule); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (arguing that law
and economics has failed to provide plausible descriptive theories of many important contract law doctrines).
15 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
9

10
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untrained in economics, are likely to rely on moral intuitions
when reaching results.16 And Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars
long have insisted on the indeterminacy of contract law, arguing
that contract law outcomes are best explained as a reflection of
cultural values, as operationalized by powerful decision makers.17
The Market Theory is less successful as a normative or prescriptive theory, however. As we will show, Oman makes moral
judgments about the validity of certain markets (and, therefore,
certain contracts) without providing a theoretical framework to
replace either the moralist or economic theories he rejects.18 As a
result, the Market Theory fails to provide meaningful guidance to
courts, policymakers, or scholars confronted with the more difficult questions facing contract law.19
II. THE LIMITS OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT)
Under the Market Theory, contract law exists to strengthen
and support markets.20 However, markets are not ends in themselves.21 Instead, the law supports markets only because and to
the extent that markets provide other moral virtues.22 Therefore,
unlike the economic analysis of law that it seeks to replace, the
Market Theory of contract is deeply interested in normative questions of morality.23 According to Oman:
Markets can be evil. Just as well-functioning markets have important moral consequences, pernicious markets can cause harm,
destroy valuable social and personal goods, and invade aspects
of life that should be separated from commerce. ... [P]ernicious
markets mark the limits of contract law. If contract law ought
to be structured to support well-functioning markets because such
markets are morally valuable, it follows that, when markets
are pernicious, the justification for contract law fails—or at the
POSNER, supra note 5, at 233.
See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Contract Law and Practice, ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 257 (“Legal decisions are guided
by the invisible hand of our complex cultural values, operating through their
embodiment in our social decision makers.”).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 56–61.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 42ï48.
20 OMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
21 See id. at 15.
22 Id. at 16.
23 See id. at 11, 16.
16
17
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very least weakens dramatically. The market argument thus accounts for the universal limitations that we observe in all legal
systems on the enforcement of contracts. It also focuses our attention on the question that we must ask in order to understand
the limits of contract law: When are markets pernicious?24

For reasons that we detail below, however, the concept of
“pernicious markets” has been widely contested.25 Indeed, entire
books challenge the premise that market trading can introduce
wrongs into a previously unproblematic activity.26 Some activities
or actions may be pernicious, of course, particularly when they
impose harm on third parties.27 The law discourages many of
these activities by making them illegal. But this is a statement
about the evils of the underlying activity, rather than a statement
about the evils of a particular market.28
As we will show in Sections A–B, Oman’s purported examples
of evil markets are actually examples of evil activities (although,
as we detail in Sections B–C, Oman provides no criteria for determining the evilness of any given activity).29 Accordingly, the market argument does not delineate the limits of contract, nor can it
“account for universal limitations that we observe in all legal systems on the enforcement of contracts[,]” except perhaps to say that
contract enforcement depends on the prevailing norms, prejudices,
and culture of the relevant legal regime.30
A. Evil Markets Versus Evil Activity: Slavery
Oman invokes the example of involuntary servitude and of
the Atlantic slave trade, in particular, a number of times as an
Id. at 160–61 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN & PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT
LIMITS: MORAL VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 16, 18, 92–93 (2016) (arguing
that the market does not transform moral acts into immoral ones); Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, vi (2009) (demonstrating the cultural
and historical dependence of views regarding which items properly “belong” in
the marketplace).
26 See generally BRENNAN & JAWORSKI, supra note 25.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 33–35.
28 See infra Section II.A.
29 See infra Sections II.A–C.
30 OMAN, supra note 1, at 160–61.
24
25
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illustration of a morally evil market that contract law should not
support.31 According to Oman:
The Atlantic slave trade is one of the great moral catastrophes
of history. Its scale and the brutality of its conditions, for example, dwarf other instances of human slavery. Unlike tragedies such as the Holocaust or the mass murders perpetrated by
Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, the slave trade was fundamentally a
market atrocity. ... It provides the best historical example of a
pernicious market. Whatever benefits the commerce in humans
might have conferred on merchants or planters, it cannot erase
the human misery and degradation wrought by the slave trade.
Given the evils of such a market, the law should not have supported it. Accordingly, one should not enforce contracts for the
sale of slaves.32

Yet, Oman’s slavery example tells us very little about the
limits of markets or of contract law, because slavery is an example
of a pernicious practice, not a pernicious market. Forced slavery
is almost universally considered wrong, not because of market
trading, but because to own another human being is inconsistent
with basic morality and human rights.33 This conclusion is not
dependent on the existence of market trading in slaves and would
hold even if the law prohibited the sale of slaves but permitted
their acquisition and ownership through other means. If, for example, slaves could be inherited, but not sold, or if a society were
to permit the gifting of slaves to commemorate holidays and birthdays, but banned the commercial slave trade, no dominant moral
theory would suggest that the absence of market trading renders
slavery moral.34
This is because slavery is an immoral practice, without regard to the presence or absence of market trading. If it is immoral
to own slaves, gift slaves, or devise slaves by will, then it follows
that it is also immoral to trade in slaves and, it logically follows,
that such contracts should not be enforced. But notice that this
conclusion has nothing to do with slavery as a market. To be sure,
Id. at 163.
Id. (emphasis added).
33 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4
(Dec. 10, 1948).
34 Id. (prohibiting both the slave trade and the holding of another in servitude or slavery).
31
32
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there is somewhat more debate surrounding the morality of voluntary servitude, such as bonded labor.35 But this is not the debate
on which Oman relies for insights about the limits of markets,
invoking instead the example of the Atlantic slave trade.36
A few examples will highlight the difference between forced
slavery and transactions that are not considered immoral in the
absence of commercial trading. There are certain items and activities whose exchange is not only permitted, but applauded, when
motivated by a purpose other than profit-seeking—love, altruism,
kindness, or a sense of duty, for example.37 In fact, a failure to
provide these goods and services in the context of certain relationships may be condemned as selfish or self-indulgent.38 A decision
to carry and give birth to a child for my infertile sister is likely to
be lauded as compassionate and charitable.39 A failure to donate
a life-saving kidney to my dying brother will strike some as inexcusably selfish. Selling either in a commercial transaction is morally contested and often illegal.40 In each case, it is the involvement
of the market that generates discomfort with the transaction, rather
than the transaction itself.
Oman seems to believe that because the marketplace exacerbated slavery’s evils, “the slave trade was fundamentally a market
atrocity.”41 But the simple exercise of questioning whether we would
approve of slavery in the absence of market trading suggests that
this is not the case. And a new and elaborate market-based theory
of contract is unnecessary to reach that result.
B. The Digital Pedophile and the Indebted Gambler
Like slavery, the digital pedophile is an example that Oman
frequently invokes as an example of an evil market that contract
law should not support.42 Says Oman:
See generally DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE,
Ch. 8 (2010) (detailing this debate).
36 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 163–64.
37 Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2010).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1741 (discussing the taboo nature of commercial surrogacy).
40 Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Repugnance Management and Transactions in the Body, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 86, 86–87 (2017).
41 OMAN, supra note 1, at 163.
42 Id. at 12.
35
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[T]he satisfaction of evil preferences is not morally desirable. The
world is not better if a twisted sadist can indulge his desire to
watch violent child pornography, even if no children are harmed
and the twisted sadist’s actions have no other third-party effects.43

As Oman recognizes, traditional economic analysis would
consider this transaction welfare enhancing, under the conditions
specified by Oman—the sadist is made better off, and no one else
is made worse off.44 The digital pedophile’s actions are thus Pareto
improving. Indeed, Oman specifically invokes the digital pedophile example to illustrate what he perceives as a central flaw in
the economic theory of contract—its lack of attention to questions
of morality.45
But Oman never explains why the world is not better off if
the twisted sadist can satisfy his preferences with no negative
third-party effects, simply asserting it as if the answer is obvious.46
But the answer is far from obvious. Indeed, even the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with this question, before declaring a statute
prohibiting digital, or virtual, child pornography unconstitutional.47
For many theorists, of course, efficiency is not the only, or
even the primary, relevant criterion for judging the value of any
particular market or transaction.48 But, a rigorous debate about
whether the world is made better off by the satisfaction of a digital pedophile’s preferences needs to be grounded on some evaluation criteria. Because the Market Theory provides no normative
basis for reaching its determination that digital child pornography
Id.
POSNER, supra note 5, at 230–32 (discussing Pareto efficiency).
45 OMAN, supra note 1, at 12.
46 See id.
47 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255–56 (2002). In reaching its
decision the Court concluded:
[T]he CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims
by its production. Virtual child pornography is not “intrinsically related” to the
sexual abuse of children. While the Government asserts that the images can lead
to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect.
Id. at 250. Six years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Congressional response to the Free Speech Coalition ruling, The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
48 See, e.g., SATZ, supra note 35, at 182 (discussing the limits of efficiency as
a gauge for determining the desirability of many transactions).
43
44

444 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:435
is an evil market not worth supporting, it provides no guidance on
how courts would, or should, address other transactions in which
neither third parties nor the participants to the contract are harmed.
A similar problem arises in Oman’s treatment of gambling.
According to Oman, Nevada, though famous for gambling and casinos, refuses to enforce contracts creating gambling debts.49 Oman
speaks with seeming approval of Nevada’s policy, noting:
Nevada does not take a paternalistic attitude toward gambling.
If its citizens (or visitors from other states) wish to gamble, Nevada
does not prohibit them from doing so. It does not follow from this,
however, that Nevada must enforce their contracts. ... The litigant
calling on the state to enforce a contract is not asking to be left
free from interference in his or her private decisions. Rather, he
or she is asking that the government act to support the market
that will be strengthened by the enforcement of the contract.50

Oman is, of course, correct that the mere fact that Nevada
permits gambling does not require it to enforce gambling contracts.
At common law, cash settled forward contracts were legal, but
unenforceable, precisely on the theory that they were speculative
contracts, akin to gambling.51 Today a number of states permit
gestational surrogacy arrangements, but refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts.52
But Oman provides no justification to support Nevada’s
53
policy. Thus the Market Theory, rather than providing a predictive framework for understanding contract, instead seems to suggest that communities will enforce contracts when they believe that
the underlying behavior is worthy and will fail to do so when they
disapprove of the underlying behavior.
OMAN, supra note 1, at 164.
Id. at 165.
51 Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 714–15 (1998).
52 The Center for American Progress provides a summary of surrogacy laws
by jurisdiction, showing that some states ban the practice (sometimes with criminal
penalties and sometimes not) and others simply declare surrogacy contracts void
and unenforceable as against public policy. Center for American Progress, Guide
to State Surrogacy Laws (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.american-progress.org/issues
/women/news/2007/12/17/3758/guide-to-state-surrogacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc
/L4HW-5HJ2].
53 OMAN, supra note 1, at 165.
49
50
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This may indeed be true as a descriptive matter, but is not
novel—as already noted, adherents of both law and economics and
CLS have recognized this feature of the law.54 More importantly,
however, the distinction does not appear to be about supporting
markets. Oman never argues, for example, that gambling markets
fail to provide the social benefits he extols in The Dignity of Commerce
or provides any other reason for Nevada’s decision that would lend
certainty to cases going forward.55
C. Taboo Markets
So far, we have shown that the Market Theory, by claiming
to draw the line at immoral markets without providing a coherent
theory by which to judge that immorality, falls short as both a normative and prescriptive theory of contract law.56 In an age of increasing market skepticism, this is a disappointment. Numerous
books, academic articles, and popular press pieces have emerged
in recent years lamenting a perceived expansion of markets and
identifying dozens, if not hundreds, of potentially pernicious markets.57 The most prominent voice is perhaps that of Michael Sandel,
whose New York Times bestseller identifies markets in prison cells,
car pool lanes, international surrogacy, rights to shoot endangered
species, concierge medicine, carbon emissions, university legacy admissions, military force, line standing, book reading, and dozens of
other “new” markets as potentially pernicious.58
A Market Theory that celebrated the positive attributes of
markets, as The Dignity of Commerce surely does, while providing
guidance on the appropriate limits of the marketplace would be a
welcome contribution to the literature. Unfortunately, Oman’s Market Theory tells us very little about these and other contested
POSNER, supra note 5, at 233; Spann, supra note 17, at 257.
OMAN, supra note 1, at 165.
56 Supra Sections II.AïB.
57 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 8, at 3ï5 (2012) (detailing a number of potentially pernicious markets).
58 Id. at 15. We label such markets “new” because, despite Sandel’s claims
of novelty, at least some of the markets identified by Sandel, such as surrogacy,
sex work, and mercenaries, are not new at all, while others simply take on a new
form, as technological or other changes permit forms of commerce not possible
before. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 37, at 1742, 1747, 1747 n.23 (discussing
modern variations on ancient markets).
54
55
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markets, as fully highlighted in the book’s final chapter, which
addresses pernicious markets.59
Given the prior discussion of gambling contracts and digital
pedophiles in Section II.B, one might expect Oman to view traditional taboo markets—such as those for surrogacy services, sex work,
and human bodily materials—with skepticism.60 After all, these are
unquestionably controversial exchanges, criticized by observers
around the world and prohibited in many jurisdictions. But this
does not appear to be the case.61 In discussing surrogacy contracts,
for example, Oman notes that “[w]e no longer need to speculate
about the social effects of surrogacy agreements. Such contracts
will be honored in at least some states, and we now have more than
a generation of experience with their effects. The dystopian, commodified future feared by Radin has not materialized.”62
To be sure, we agree with Oman’s analysis of the evidence
on surrogacy arrangements and with his conclusions. Our point
is simply that his analysis is inconsistent with the discussion of
gambling and digital pedophiles detailed in Section II.B. Recall
that in the case of digital pedophiles, Oman condemned the market
as immoral, without respect to the costs and benefits of the behavior.63 Yet, in the case of surrogacy contracts, Oman urges us to
consider evidence of the market’s costs and benefits.64 Moreover,
Oman seems to overlook what is, to surrogacy critics, the most serious objection to commercial surrogacy and other taboo trades—
the corrupting effect on social values.65 Such costs are amorphous
and not easily identified or measured. Surrogacy critics would thus
deny that the evidence proves such fears unfounded.
To reiterate, we agree with Oman’s approach to surrogacy
contracts and other taboo markets. But then we would also enforce
See OMAN, supra note 1, at 160.
See supra Section II.B.
61 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 170–71.
62 Id. at 171.
63 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 12.
64 Id. at 171–72.
65 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES xiii, 142–43 (1996) (arguing that commercial surrogacy is commodifying, reinforces a gender hierarchy and corrupts parent-child relationships more generally); ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 168 (1993) (“[c]ontract pregnancy commodifies both women’s labor and children in ways that undermine the autonomy
and dignity of women and the love parents owe to children.”)
59
60
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contracts for digital pornography, assuming the lack of negative
externalities posited by Oman. But for opponents of taboo markets, such as Margaret Radin, Elizabeth Anderson, and Michael
Sandel, the objections to surrogacy and other taboo markets are
similar, if not identical, to the objections to digital child pornography—that it corrupts and demeans not only the participants to
the transaction, but society more generally.66 Oman’s apparent
rejection of these concerns reinforces our sense that his metrics
for judging the immorality of markets and transactions are fluid
and, perhaps, idiosyncratic. Society’s collective attitude towards
any activity, and its collective attitude towards markets in any
activity, varies across cultures and time.67 But our sense is that the
Market Theory seeks to do more than suggest that contract disputes are often resolved against these background cultural norms. If
that is correct, then the Market Theory must articulate some systematic and consistent principles in order to succeed as a prescriptive
theory of contract.
CONCLUSION
The Dignity of Commerce is an important book on an important topic. Indeed, one of us (Krawiec) has adopted the book as
required reading in an Advanced Contracts course for two straight
years. Moreover, The Dignity of Commerce is particularly timely.
We live in a time during which the definition of what constitutes
a market has become broader than ever and the number of goods
and services distributed through market forces appears to increase
almost daily.68 These changes are enabled partly by advances in
economic theories and partly by modern technology.69 But regardless of the underlying drivers, markets play an increasingly significant role in our social and economic activities, replacing some
activities traditionally facilitated by idiosyncratic individual efforts,
and kindness or altruism.
See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 65, at 133; ANDERSON, supra note 65, at 148;
SANDEL, supra note 8, at 95.
67 Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
37, 37–58 (discussing a variety of “repugnant activities” and the impact of people’s repugnance on the underlying markets).
68 ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT—AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN 15, 20ï22, 225 (2015).
69 See, e.g., id. at 15, 20ï23, 225 (discussing these developments).
66
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These changes are alarming to many observers, who believe
that they conflict with traditional moral intuitions and threaten
to displace nonmarket values and ideals.70 Seen in this context,
Oman’s robust defense of commerce and the marketplace as contributing to human flourishing is a refreshing and welcome contribution.71 Yet, Oman’s Market Theory, which he argues is superior
to the moralist and economic philosophies that currently dominate
contract theory, is ultimately unsuccessful on its own terms.72 To
be sure, devising a new theory of contract law is no easy feat, and
we applaud the effort. But the Market Theory ultimately falls
short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract.
To return to the question with which we began, does contract law need morality? This, of course, is an old debate that extends well beyond normative theories of contract law. 73 The extent
to which law, public policy, and theory should account for values
other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate, and one
we need not resolve here.74 Instead, we merely conclude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid,
subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of
markets. Although the “I know it when I see it” approach to morality may accurately describe the way courts and lawmakers approach difficult questions of contract law, it has little to do with
supporting the moral virtues of markets and fails to provide a
prescriptive theory to guide future cases.75

E.g., RADIN, supra note 65, at 142–43; ANDERSON, supra note 65, at 168.
OMAN, supra note 1, at 125.
72 See, e.g., id. at 8, 11, 16.
73 E.g., SATZ, supra note 35, at 182 (rejecting efficiency as the sole measure
of the assessment of a market); POSNER, supra note 5, at 229–34 (discussing this
debate within contract law).
74 Id.
75 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
70
71

